Case 5

Linux rootkit compromise: trojanized utilities and boot persistence

Reconstructed a rootkit installation on a Honeynet Linux root partition with Autopsy and a read-only EXT2 block parser. Installation confirmed; entry vector and mail delivery not proven.

Tools
Autopsy · Python · PowerShell · Timeline Explorer · VS Code
Category
Computer · Linux

Case LIN-001: Linux rootkit compromise

Honeynet Scan of the Month #15 · Confirmed: post-compromise rootkit installation

Item Value
Case ID LIN-001
Evidence Linux EXT2 root partition image
Prepared by Turki Adnan Abbas · تركي عدنان عباس
Scope Independent examination of a public training image

Assessment. Rootkit installation is confirmed through matching system-binary hashes, hidden staging artifacts, boot-script modification and recovered deleted files. The initial intrusion vector and successful outbound email delivery remain unproven.

Evidence provenance: public Honeynet training dataset. No live compromised host was examined.

01. Executive determination

The supplied forensic image (honeypot.hda8.dd) contains convergent evidence that an attacker installed a Linux rootkit. The archive /lk.tgz was identified in deleted-space records; rootkit-specific executables were present at their target system paths, hidden components were recovered under /dev/ida/.drag-on, and a startup command consistent with the recovered installer was visible in /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit.

Question Assessment Basis
Was a rootkit installed? CONFIRMED Executable hashes, hidden copies, boot modification
Were system utilities replaced? CONFIRMED ps, netstat, ifconfig; matching archive and allocated hashes
Was persistence configured? CONFIRMED Injected startup entry in rc.sysinit
Was system inventory created? CONFIRMED Recovered plaintext in unallocated blocks 90417–90418
Were credentials stolen? NOT ESTABLISHED Sniffer/parsing capability; no proven stolen credential set
Was email delivered outside? NOT ESTABLISHED Messages prepared; mail or network delivery logs unavailable
How did the intruder first enter? UNDETERMINED Initial access/authentication evidence unavailable

02. Scope, source and integrity

Scope: file-system-level examination of the public Honeynet Scan of the Month #15 root partition only, with corroboration from the investigator’s Autopsy screenshots, exported orphan-file CSV, recovered file-content views and a read-only extraction of two unallocated EXT2 blocks. The image represents /dev/hda8 mounted at /. The separate /var volume (/dev/hda7) was not included in the examined material.

Item Value
Primary image honeypot.hda8.dd — EXT2 root partition; Red Hat-era Linux
MD5 (image) 5a8ebf5725b15e563c825be85f2f852e
Reference image MD5 5a8ebf5725b15e563c825be85f2f852e (Honeynet)
Data examined Allocated files, unallocated inodes, deleted archive, recovered blocks
Tooling Autopsy 4.23.1; Timeline Explorer; PowerShell; Python read-only block parser; VS Code Restricted Mode
Time basis Autopsy values transcribed as displayed (AST). No conversion to other time zones.

Integrity caveat. The image MD5 is supported by a terminal screenshot and the public reference. An independently computed SHA-256 of the primary image was not available in the evidence package; this report is not a complete chain-of-custody record.

03. Examination methodology

  • Established image identity against the public reference; reviewed allocated and deleted areas in Autopsy.
  • Identified the deleted /lk.tgz archive and inspected its 23 recovered components without executing the files.
  • Compared the SHA/MD5 artifacts provided by Autopsy and an exported orphan-file inventory with the allocated Linux binaries.
  • Examined hidden directories, tcp.log, the installation script, network service files and rc.sysinit.
  • Searched indexed and unallocated material for system-reconnaissance remnants; read EXT2 blocks 90417–90418 without writing to the image.
  • Examined root shell history and account records as contextual checks; explicitly separated findings from unverified hypotheses.

04. Detailed findings

F01. Deleted rootkit archive and contents

An unallocated/deleted /lk.tgz archive was identified. The archive contains a last/ directory and 23 entries, including install, cleaner, linsniffer, logclear, mkxfs, ps, netstat, ifconfig, top, inetd.conf, services, ssh and supporting SSH/CGI tools. The recovered installer is a shell script; no direct execution was performed during this examination.

Evidence: E01–E02; Figure 01.

F02. Trojanized system binaries and recovered originals

Allocated paths /bin/ps, /bin/netstat and /sbin/ifconfig match the hashes of the corresponding rootkit archive binaries. Separate orphaned inode records identify older executable bodies with different hashes. The 04:45:02 AST change-time cluster is consistent with installer-driven file replacement, and the recovered shell script includes explicit remove-and-replace commands.

Utility Installed / rootkit MD5 Unallocated inode / MD5
/bin/ps 7728c15d89f27e376950f96a7510bf0f 30191 / 5e1725f2734365fef9e55398785f3033
/bin/netstat 2b07576213c1c8b942451459b3dc4903 30188 / f174e862d00d0998c3fa4ccd632019b5
/sbin/ifconfig 086394958255553f6f38684dad97869e 48284 / b52af438845c776cde94f67e19cd037a

The local CSV directly supports the unallocated status, timestamps and hashes. The hashes above are MD5 for artifact correlation, not a claim of modern cryptographic collision resistance.

F03. Hidden staging and network-monitoring artifacts

Autopsy shows an allocated /dev/ida/.drag-on/ directory containing linsniffer, logclear, mkxfs, sense, sl2, s, SSH material and tcp.log. The installer creates the staging folder and copies those components to it. The tcp.log text view contains entries referring to ports 21 (FTP) and 23 (Telnet), with a timeout marker. This supports deployed network-monitoring capability and possible observed traffic, but does not prove credential capture or exfiltration.

Evidence: E05–E06; Figures 03–04. Classification: malicious staging and potential network sniffing.

F04. Persistence and anti-forensic installation logic

The recovered install script contains unset HISTFILE, replacement of /bin/ps, /bin/netstat, /sbin/ifconfig and /usr/bin/top, startup-file modification, CGI placement attempts, and deletion of last, lk.tgz and computer. The currently allocated rc.sysinit includes a rootkit-related /usr/bin/lsattr command at its end. Therefore the boot-time persistence configuration is established; an actual later reboot and execution are not independently demonstrated.

Evidence: E07–E09; Figures 05–08. Script behavior is intent unless independently corroborated on the imaged system.

Installer code analysis: what the recovered shell script actually does

The recovered last/install file is a privileged Bourne-shell installer, not merely a collection of suspicious file names. It performs a scripted sequence intended to replace trusted administration commands with attacker-supplied binaries, conceal selected activity, prepare network-monitoring tools, retain access at boot, and collect host inventory for email. Its first lines clear the display and unset HISTFILE to discourage command-history retention; it then changes package-file ownership to root and checks for build/SSH prerequisites. Those checks print status messages but do not themselves establish that the prerequisites were present.

Lines Observed code / action Operational purpose and interpretation
31–39 rm -rf then mv: ifconfig, netstat, ps, top; copy mkxfs Removes installed utilities and places kit binaries at standard command paths. ps/netstat/ifconfig replacements were independently corroborated by hashes.
44–65 Writes process-name patterns to /dev/rpm and IP/port entries to /dev/last Creates configuration lists consistent with filtering or hiding processes and network information; the precise rule semantics were not independently reverse-engineered.
69–76 Creates /dev/ida/.drag-on; copies linsniffer, logclear, sense, sl2, mkxfs and SSH material; touches tcp.log Stages monitoring/maintenance components in a concealed directory and initializes log-file placeholders. The hidden directory and tcp.log are present in the image.
78–80 Copies inetd.conf and services into /etc; sends HUP to inetd Overwrites network-service configuration and asks inetd to reload it. Installed files match the kit; this alone does not prove a particular backdoor service ran.
85–91 Replaces /usr/bin/lsattr; appends invocation to rc.sysinit; chmod 500; chattr +i; invokes lsattr Installs a masquerading binary, sets an automatic boot-time invocation and makes that binary harder to change or delete using the immutable attribute. The added rc.sysinit line is independently present.
95–118 Moves last.cgi into existing web-server cgi-bin folders, if found Attempts to expose a CGI component through whichever listed web-server directory exists; the script does not itself prove that a reachable CGI endpoint was deployed.
120–132 Collects uname, hostname, interface IP, uptime, CPU and disk details in computer; pipes to mail twice Builds host-reconnaissance output and prepares two outbound messages. Recovered unallocated blocks contain the resulting addressed message bodies; successful delivery is unverified.
139–140 Changes to / and removes last, lk.tgz, computer and lk.tar.gz Deletes installer material and the temporary inventory file to reduce local traces; deleted-image artifacts support cleanup activity.

Causality and confidence. Finding these commands in a recovered installer proves the kit was designed to perform these operations, not that every branch succeeded. Independent image artifacts confirm replacement of three system binaries, the hidden staging path, the changed /etc files, a persistence line in rc.sysinit, and recovered reconnaissance text. No evidence establishes execution of last.cgi, a later successful reboot, captured passwords, or completion of email delivery. Figures 05–07 show the command sequence; Figure 08 documents the startup file’s change time.

F05. Network-service configuration replacement

The allocated /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services files match the respective recovered archive and orphan-file MD5 values. Both show metadata-change timestamps at approximately 04:45:03 AST, consistent with the installer. Examination of inetd.conf revealed active Telnet and POP3 entries but did not establish that either service was maliciously introduced. The separate identd.conf file is not an earlier copy of inetd.conf.

File Allocated MD5 Matching deleted inode
/etc/inetd.conf b63485e42035328c0d900a71ff2e6bd7 2044
/etc/services 54e41f035e026f439d4188759b210f07 2046

F06. System reconnaissance and attempted email exfiltration

The installer builds a file named computer using uname, hostname, ifconfig, uptime, /proc/cpuinfo and df; it passes this output to mail twice. A read-only extraction of EXT2 data blocks 90417 and 90418 recovered plaintext message bodies with Linux kernel 2.2.14-5.0, host asdf1, internal IP 172.16.1.108, CPU details and filesystem usage. The extracted messages identify subjects placinte and roote and recipients last@linuxmail.org and bidi_damm@yahoo.com respectively. Actual mail transmission and receipt were not established.

Evidence: E12; Figure 11. The available image omits the separately mounted /var partition where mail and authentication logs might have resided.

F07. Additional root-account context is not an entry vector

The 211-byte /root/.bash_history lists ftp ftp.home.ro, unpacking and compiling emech-2.8, ./mech and editing ftpaccess. The history has no per-command timestamps. A zero-byte /etc/ftpaccess was observed with a 17:52:45 AST modification time; /etc/passwd and passwd- are hash-identical and do not show an added UID-0 account. These artifacts cannot be attributed to the initial intruder with the examined data and are not used to infer an initial access vector.

Evidence: E13–E14; Figures 10 and 12. Finding scope: contextual activity, no definitive actor attribution.

05. Reconstructed file-system timeline

Times as displayed by Autopsy (AST). Metadata timestamps indicate file-system changes, not directly the execution time of a specific command.

Date / time (AST) Observed event Evidence
2001-03-15 14:20:27 passwd and passwd- show matching content and metadata. E14
2001-03-16 04:45:02 Trojanized ps / netstat / ifconfig; hidden rootkit content timestamps; orphaned originals show related change times. E03–E05, E10
2001-03-16 04:45:03 inetd.conf, services and rc.sysinit modified; startup entry observed. E09, E11
2001-03-16 04:45:05 Deleted installer/configuration inodes show change times. E10
2001-03-16 17:52:45 Zero-byte ftpaccess file metadata last modified. E13 contextual
2001-03-16 17:53:00 root/.bash_history last modified. E13 contextual
2001-03-16 19:28:30 tcp.log last modified. E06

06. Conclusions and confidence

  • High confidence. The rootkit was installed, system utilities were replaced, hidden components were staged, and a startup persistence entry was present.
  • Moderate confidence. The rootkit’s network monitoring functionality was positioned to process traffic; a tcp.log exists, but the scope of any captured content is unproven.
  • High confidence (preparation), no delivery proof. System profiling data and addressed email message bodies were produced; receipt or successful transmission was not established.
  • Unresolved. Initial intrusion vector, source IP and exploit path cannot be supported by the available / partition alone. No additional account with UID 0 was identified.

The evidence supports an attacker-controlled, root-privileged post-exploitation sequence in which a deleted kit was installed, standard system utilities were substituted, hidden monitoring components were positioned, persistence was configured, and host inventory was prepared for outbound email. The analysis does not claim a particular vulnerability, initial-login method, attacker identity or confirmed data delivery.

07. Limitations and integrity statement

  • Only the root EXT2 partition (/dev/hda8) was provided; /var (/dev/hda7) and network/IDS packet captures were not examined.
  • No comprehensive original acquisition log, custody chain or primary image SHA-256 manifest was available.
  • A file-system change time is not necessarily a user command-execution time. No conclusion here relies solely on created-date fields rendered as 0000-00-00.
  • Non-executed malware analysis only. The installer and potentially hostile binaries were not run on the analysis system.

08. Evidence register

ID Source / artifact Disposition
E01 /lk.tgz — deleted archive Primary
E02 last/ rootkit package (23 entries) Primary
E03 /bin/ps; /bin/netstat — installed hashes Primary
E04 /sbin/ifconfig — installed hash Primary
E05 /dev/ida/.drag-on — hidden rootkit tools Primary
E06 /dev/ida/.drag-on/tcp.log Primary, bounded inference
E07 last/install — replacement commands Primary script
E08 last/install — persistence, email and cleanup Primary script
E09 /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit — injected entry Primary
E10 OrphanFiles CSV — 26 records + 3 original binaries Primary exported metadata
E11 /etc/services; /etc/inetd.conf hashes Primary
E12 Unallocated blocks 90417–90418 — system inventory Primary recovered content
E13 /root/.bash_history; /etc/ftpaccess Context; not attributed
E14 /etc/passwd vs /etc/passwd- Context; not malicious

09. Indicators and pivot references

Indicator type Value Meaning
Directory /dev/ida/.drag-on/ Hidden staging location
Original archive /lk.tgz (deleted) Recovered rootkit distribution
Startup file /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit Configured persistence
Monitoring /dev/ida/.drag-on/linsniffer Network sniffer component
Network-log file /dev/ida/.drag-on/tcp.log Observed FTP/Telnet log references
Email recipient last@linuxmail.org From script and recovered message body
Email recipient bidi_damm@yahoo.com From script and recovered message body
Local IP 172.16.1.108 Imaged host network interface
Hostname asdf1 Imaged host
Source image MD5 5a8ebf5725b15e563c825be85f2f852e Dataset integrity reference

10. Selected evidence figures

Screenshots are cropped for readability. Screenshots of software errors, repeated views and unrelated cases are excluded.

Figure 1

Recovered rootkit archive lk.tar\last: file names, sizes and timestamps, including ps, netstat and ifconfig

Recovered rootkit archive lk.tar\last: file names, sizes and timestamps, including ps, netstat and ifconfig
SHA-256
bd3ec5595013de3515a14457a4b2c6e947c3f68ac3cedb2a6baa971254d64abe

Figure 2

Autopsy /sbin: ifconfig changed 2001-03-16 04:45:02 AST, 19,840 bytes, the size of the kit's ifconfig

Autopsy /sbin: ifconfig changed 2001-03-16 04:45:02 AST, 19,840 bytes, the size of the kit's ifconfig
SHA-256
d635cde51792f0f67e30f3f2a928fa7870e293f011b876a90a80be7b7f97bbfd

Figure 3

Hidden directory /dev/ida/.drag-on: linsniffer, logclear, mkxfs, s, sense, sl2, SSH material and tcp.log

Hidden directory /dev/ida/.drag-on: linsniffer, logclear, mkxfs, s, sense, sl2, SSH material and tcp.log
File
03-hidden-drag-on.png · 42.8 KB
SHA-256
bbe8e26e74e2cb001025de32e10c374bd6e1a718067475d22e91955850af33a9

Figure 4

tcp.log strings: connections to asdf1 on ports 21 and 23, and a [Timed Out] marker

tcp.log strings: connections to asdf1 on ports 21 and 23, and a [Timed Out] marker
File
04-tcp-log.png · 52.1 KB
SHA-256
02abce038469f76a2f58f891c8e2163d7907b6c743b0f6f82430aa4eade05857

Figure 5

Installer, lines 1–36: unset HISTFILE, then rm -rf and mv over ifconfig, netstat and ps (user name redacted)

Installer, lines 1–36: unset HISTFILE, then rm -rf and mv over ifconfig, netstat and ps (user name redacted)
SHA-256
782f32dba15b7472e89bd9a5d4ae4a942c8934355c5eb86b125dfdadb91aa3f0

Figure 6

Installer, lines 46–80: hiding lists in /dev/rpm and /dev/last, the .drag-on stage, inetd.conf and services (user name redacted)

Installer, lines 46–80: hiding lists in /dev/rpm and /dev/last, the .drag-on stage, inetd.conf and services (user name redacted)
SHA-256
2012d2d86495d2b00b0c7e364f8157fa39a05823e9c8682fbeae16afdc77a8a7

Figure 7

Installer, lines 104–138: last.cgi placement, the computer inventory, and mail to last@linuxmail.org and bidi_damm@yahoo.com

Installer, lines 104–138: last.cgi placement, the computer inventory, and mail to last@linuxmail.org and bidi_damm@yahoo.com
SHA-256
34ef0aef8cd7f4a66f3222a19e38972a7d2b8350b91970f1cfb2c0c52c828862

Figure 8

/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit: modified and changed 2001-03-16 04:45:03 AST, in the installer's time cluster

/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit: modified and changed 2001-03-16 04:45:03 AST, in the installer's time cluster
File
08-rc-sysinit.png · 41.7 KB
SHA-256
c183f075ae7527057a4fc7e9a8d4188f3cc046deb7ecc0431e43c9505c808869

Figure 9

$OrphanFiles: the deleted kit inodes 2039–2061, and the original binaries at inodes 30188, 30191 and 48284

$OrphanFiles: the deleted kit inodes 2039–2061, and the original binaries at inodes 30188, 30191 and 48284
File
09-orphan-inodes.png · 84.1 KB
SHA-256
06258936c8984bb53da4007a8f2ae56fc900ce9aadc632d5fa6681b2c7d4ad28

Figure 10

/etc: passwd and passwd- with the same size and timestamps; no added account

/etc: passwd and passwd- with the same size and timestamps; no added account
File
10-etc-passwd.png · 78.9 KB
SHA-256
09ef2143286b743c1b5aff7fe15ac33e7ef2a2e6f2d22d5c922369e3dda5b074

Figure 11

Read-only extraction of EXT2 blocks 90417–90418: the host profile addressed to two recipients (user name redacted)

Read-only extraction of EXT2 blocks 90417–90418: the host profile addressed to two recipients (user name redacted)
SHA-256
56c86c2b78714ce5c1f5903a111c298ae10224b94c6e51bb31c2ed72cc6a9e88

Figure 12

/root/.bash_history: ftp ftp.home.ro, emech-2.8 built and ./mech run; no timestamps

/root/.bash_history: ftp ftp.home.ro, emech-2.8 built and ./mech run; no timestamps
SHA-256
6aeec080c4427948c59849747d2f77483336ff60708db8056beef1ef449cffaa

All work

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